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**1. ISRAEL AGREES TO PLACEMENT OF UN OBSERVERS
ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER**

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The Israeli permanent UN representative has informed the American delegation that Israel has agreed with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization on the establishment of five UN observer posts in the area of the recent incidents along the Israeli-Syrian border. The arrangement is to go into effect on 13 or 14 July for a trial period of one month, but does not provide for observers in the demilitarized zone. The Israeli official assured the delegation that Israel was not going to sabotage the arrangements. He said he was displeased at rumors of an early Security Council meeting.

Comment This limited Israeli acceptance of numerous United Nations requests for observers along the Israeli-Syrian border appears to be an attempt to avert a full-scale Security Council investigation of continuing tensions in the demilitarized zone and the recent incidents on the border.

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2. NEW JOBS REPORTED FOR PURGED SOVIET LEADERS

[redacted] Molotov had asked to be appointed ambassador to a South American country since he lacked a specialty other than that of diplomat. He was temporarily attached to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pending a decision.

Shepilov, [redacted] had been appointed to work in the local Soviet press in Kazakhstan and had already left Moscow. Kaganovich had been assigned to the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow as a scientific adviser.

Malenkov, [redacted] the main force in the group opposing Khrushchev, was being sent to a Siberian Council of National Economy to head a local electric power station administration.

The fates of Pervukhin and Saburov were not known publicly in the USSR except for the official announcement of their demotion and removal, respectively. [redacted]

Comment

The Paris newspaper, France Soir on 12 July, quoting Soviet diplomatic sources, stated that Molotov had been offered the Soviet ambassadorial post in Argentina.

By 14 July Soviet citizens had not yet been informed of Malenkov's appointment as director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk electric power station in East Kazakhstan, announced to the West by Moscow radio on 10 July.

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3. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS SOVIET PURGE

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British Foreign Office specialists on Soviet affairs are divided as to Khrushchev's motivation for the June purge. The majority believes he set out some

time ago systematically to undermine Malenkov, and that what united the "antiparty" group on quick action was a report that Khrushchev intended to link Malenkov's name with the "Leningrad Affair" (a purge of the Leningrad party organization in 1949) when he went to the Leningrad anniversary celebration scheduled for 22 June.

Khrushchev is said to have been motivated both by personal ambition and by impatience with restraints imposed by collective leadership, which he felt was inherently too unstable to function in present-day Russia.

The British embassy in Moscow reported in early June that the effect, though not the motivation, of Khrushchev's economic reorganization plan was to weaken the power of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Per-vukhin, and Saburov by eliminating centralized industrial ministries. Candidates for the Gorky and Leningrad economic regional councils, for example, reportedly were nominated by the local oblast party committees, which are subject to the wishes of Party First Secretary Khrushchev.

The "antiparty" group failed not because its members were maladroit but because they had no choice but to launch a desperate counterattack in the face of Khrushchev's pushing them toward political oblivion. In this view, Khrushchev knows where he is going and now has a relatively free hand. He will counter his only potential rival, Marshal Zhukov, by building up his own prestige and the authority of the Communist Party.

The minority view in the Foreign Office is that Khrushchev barely escaped being overthrown by a majority in the presidium and acted defensively. He only stood

to lose by destruction of the myth of "collective leadership," under which others could be made to share responsibility for what were essentially Khrushchev policies. Khrushchev saved his career but solved none of his problems. The stability of the regime has been further compromised by his now obvious dependence on Zhukov and the military.

Comment The majority opinion offers an answer to the question of why the "antiparty" group moved against Khrushchev in the presidium with no assurance that the central committee or the military would side against Khrushchev.

4. PUBLIC REACTION IN MOSCOW TO SOVIET PURGE

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[REDACTED]

The "impressionistic conclusions" of the American embassy in Moscow from conversations with more than 100 Soviet citizens, are that the Moscow public reacted to news of the June purges with keen interest, outward calm, and detached resignation. "They never tell us what is going on and there is nothing we can do about it," was a frequently heard statement.

No one expressed any "wrath" or "indignation" at the "perfidious actions" of the ousted leaders. On the contrary, most citizens expressed disapproval of the central committee's action. Uneasiness or fear that there might be mass purges and arrests was a frequent reaction.

Many citizens took a cynical attitude, viewing the events as merely a struggle for power among "top dogs" which was not relevant to the interests of the people. Izvestia on 9 July, perhaps with this attitude in mind, asserted that the "party's fight against the opposition group" was based on matters of principle and was not the same as the "mistakes connected with the personality cult of J. V. Stalin."

A number of people showed open sympathy for Molotov particularly, probably because he is an "Old Bolshevik" and a symbol of continuity. "How can they do that to Molotov after his many years of service?" Malenkov, widely popular among the masses for his consumers' goods program, was described as "a good man; he did a lot for the people."

The embassy has not received any reliable reports of public disturbances. No unusual troop movements were observed in Moscow on 3 or 4 July when news of the purge


began to spread through the city and there was no visual evidence or report of precautionary security measures at the time the plenum was held. The embassy adds that the first news of the change reached it on 3 July.

The embassy believes the regime has suffered a loss of prestige among the population as a result of the ousters but does not see this as affecting its ability to maintain stability. The spectacle of open warfare among the top leaders of the "monolithic" party, and the campaign of vilification loosed overnight against the deposed leaders, does not enhance respect for the party leadership. Furthermore, the ousters do not seem to have been a popular move. In the final analysis, however, the relative popularity of the Khrushchev team will depend more on the results of its policies than on what it did to the ousted group.

The Soviet public is primarily interested in an increased living standard, peace, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. The present leadership has pledged its support to these goals and will be judged by the degree to which it keeps its pledge.

**5. BONN FAVORS RECESS IN DISARMAMENT TALKS UNTIL
AFTER GERMAN ELECTION**

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 Herbert Blankenhorn, West German permanent NATO representative, told American Ambassador Perkins on 12 July that his government was concerned about the disarmament negotiations and hoped they could be recessed until after the 15 September German election. He said the government was not against an agreement, but did not know what effect inclusion of a European inspection zone might have on the campaign, how inspection might work, or what its implications might be in regard to German unification and neutralization.

He said the Germans had in mind proposing to the North Atlantic Council a series of conditions, which he did not describe, for future steps in disarmament after the first phase. Bonn felt it must be able to point to some initiative in connection with unification and disarmament.

Comment

The Germans have indicated that they want a Western understanding on when and how the unification issue will be pushed. They have also been skittish about ground inspection, apparently because they are afraid it would formalize the German interzonal border.

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